

THE EFFECTS OF US MILITARY TRAINING DURING THE COLD WAR IN LATIN AMERICA

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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the impact of US-foreign policies on democracy. We analyze the effect of the School of Americas (SOA), a US military training program for Latin-American armed forces during the Cold War, on the attitudes toward democracies in Latin America. We use a difference-in-differences model by exploiting graduates' temporal and spatial variation distribution to analyze the relationship between democracy functioning and the amount of personnel sent to the SOA. We find that the SOA program had a detrimental effect on democracy levels. The mechanism is an increase of repression in countries with more high-ranking officials receiving training in the SOA. Our paper also presents that when the SOA change to promote democratic values after the end of the Cold War, countries with more trainees (and thus higher levels of repression) experienced positive effects on democracy support. These findings provide substantial empirical evidence on the relationship between foreign policies and democracy, shedding light on the consequences of the SOA program and its impact on repression and democratic processes.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The foreign policies of developed countries transcend national boundaries, leading to the need to examine the influence of interventions on domestic policies. Developed countries are motivated to shape the policies and actions of other actors in the international system, despite the potential costs involved, to expand rich countries' agenda. States' common tactics to achieve political agenda beyond their administrative barrier include conditional aid programs that link assistance to desired performance outcomes, economic sanctions, and the support or instigation of coups d'état, as exemplified by the historical involvement of the United States in Latin America (see [Kinzer, 2006](#); [Toke et al., 2019](#)). By exploring these various means of influence, we gain insights into the complex dynamics of international relations and how states seek to shape the behaviors of other actors on the global stage. States have various means to intervene in civil wars, with direct involvement being a prominent approach discussed in the literature ([Reagan, 2002](#)).

Understanding the range of strategies available to states in influencing foreign actions is crucial. [Toke et al. \(2019\)](#) provide a comprehensive overview of states' common tactics to achieve this objective, such as conditional aid programs that link assistance to desired performance outcomes, economic sanctions, and the support or instigation of coups d'état, as exemplified by the historical involvement of the United States in Latin America (see [Kinzer, 2006](#)). By exploring these various means of influence, we gain insights into the complex dynamics of international relations and how states seek to shape the behaviors of other actors on the global stage.

States have various means to intervene in civil wars, with direct involvement being a prominent approach discussed in the literature ([Reagan, 2002](#)). However, the analysis of more subtle and indirect interventions still needs to be improved. This study delves into indirect intervention in internal conflicts, specifically examining the effects of external military training, such as aid on foreign soil, and its implications for democracy. Within the context of the Cold War, the paper centers on the influence of US military training programs on Latin American armed forces, which aided local regimes in intensifying repression while suppressing civil society activities. Moreover, the study extends its analysis to the case of Colombia, a country that experienced an ongoing internal civil conflict, to explore the specific effects of training in that region. By exploring these indirect forms of intervention, this research provides valuable insights into the complex dynamics of external involvement in civil wars and its impact on democracy and domestic affairs.

This paper fills a significant gap in the literature by examining the broader effects of international interventions beyond their original intent. Specifically, it investigates the impact of US intervention in Latin-American politics through military training provided by the School of the Americas on perceptions of democracy. Building on the concept of victimization and its influence on democracy support (in line with [Bautista et al., 2019](#)), this study expands the scope to encompass 18 Latin American countries. The findings reveal that countries that received more training from the United States during the Cold War exhibited higher levels of democratic support, which can be seen as a response to the repression experienced during that period. Highlighting the importance of studying the formation of democracy support, [Bautista et al. \(2019\)](#) emphasizes the positive correlation between well-performing democracies and internal support. Furthermore, various studies have established a link between democracy, shared values, improved governance outcomes, democratic adaptation, and citizen engagement (see [Nannicini et al., 2013](#); [Glaeser et al., 2007](#); [Persson and Tabellini, 2009](#), and others). This research contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics between international interventions, victimization, and democracy, providing valuable insights into forming democracy support across multiple countries in the Latin American context.

In section 2 we give context of United States program of military training and Colombian civil conflict, in section 3 we describe the data used in our analysis and in section 4 we discuss our empirical exercise and the identification strategies. In section 5 we show the results describe in previous sections and finally in section 6 we conclude.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1. *The School of the Americas (SOA)*. The School of Americas was an military institution created by the United States after the second world war. The main goal was to trained Latin-American armed forces under the same environmental and rules of the US army. *SOA* begin to work in 1946 just after the end of the second world war. The initial location of the school was the Panama Canal Zone exclusive zone. Until 1984 different countries sent personnel to this location to be trained under the guide of US military personnel. Initially United States wanted to fill the space leave by European nations because of the war. The objective was to create an instrument to align countries in the hemisphere with US interest. Gradually the goal mutated to a anti-communist contention program. United States changed the focus of the program with the rise of the Soviet Union an in particular with the Cuban Revolution.

Under Kennedy administration the *SOA* changed and became an instrument of the “national security doctrine”. Under this scheme, countries in the Americas did not face an international threat to democracy but an internal threat. This internal enemy was represented by left parties and movements. To succeed to this new threat conventional strategies of international war were not efficient. Instead United States provided new tools of intelligence and anti-guerrilla warfare tactics. Under the context of the cold war United States saw as a main challenge fighting the internal forces that might help and support international communism and the rival superpower: the Soviet Union.

Several human rights organization claimed that the school also instructed military in illegal activities. According to these organizations students learned among other things tactics for the dirty war¹. The tactics learnt at *SOA* might include torture, interrogation, infiltration, psychological warfare and kidnappings and enforced disappearance of political opponents. Under the view of the commanders own citizens were potential threat to national security.

The school continued its operations despite the human rights violations concerns. In 1984 the school was expelled from Panama and translated to Fort Benning Georgia. With the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war the focus of the school changed to an anti-narcotics tactic operation. The operation continues under this new approach but the concerns remained unchallenged. In 2001 the school change the name to Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC) with the participation of several western hemisphere countries that remain sending personnel to be trained. We argue that the training received by the armed forces during the cold war period its associated with an increase in repression and reduction of democracy quality. However we show after the return to democracy this strategy translated in bigger support to democracy but lower levels of support to political parties system.

2.2. *The Colombian conflict.* Colombia has a history of long internal conflict. The country has experienced several periods of internal violence. In an early period during mid 1940s the two main political parties were part of a internal civil war that lead to great amount of civil casualties. This period ended with an agreement between the two main parts. Under this agreement the two political parties rotated power alternating the presidential terms. Since this moment the country has been under a

¹For instance, McCoy (2005) shows using data for six countries that officials trained in several courses at *SOA* had a bigger probability of having committed more violations of human rights. Moreover, several visible and high ranks officer involved in several violations of human rights and members of military juntas and triggers of coups d'état were *SOA* graduates

democratic framework such as regular elections but with a big levels of violence and conflict underneath.

The current conflict started in 1964 with the creation of several left-wing guerrilla movements. This groups claimed to represented the forced beyond the bipartisan system excluded in previous power arrangements. These groups hoist the representation of rural poor peasants and its main goal is to overthrow the government. To complement the conflict under the lenses of cold war these groups were seen as a threat to state stability. Several decrees allowed the creation of militias to fight these movements. Military trained and armed civilians to fight the communist groups and the “internal enemy”. These groups in fact evolved and became paramilitary groups

The conflict escalated after mid 1980’s when both left-wing guerrilla and right-wing paramilitary groups got involved in the illegal drug trafficking. Paramilitary groups colluded under the umbrella of a unified organization. One of the main strategy of this groups included the perpetrate massacres. Under its counterinsurgency goals these groups aimed to target civilians to decimate the “local support” to guerrilla movements (Aranguren, 2001). This strategies consolidated paramilitary groups as a third party in the conflict. In 2003 the paramilitary carried a partial ceasefire and a negotiation that led to a demobilization. Nonetheless, according to [Human Rights Watch \(2010\)](#) the paramilitary cease of activities were symbolic and many splinters groups keep having actual dominance over local territories under the form of neo-paramilitary groups.

Paramilitary activities is linked to military active support from officers at the high rank levels inside the army ([Human Rights Watch, 2000](#)). I argue that *SOA* military training of brigade commanders relates and explains the emergence of these groups in particular municipalities. The ability to perform large scale operations with the *SOA* graduates blessing then transform in greater levels of civilian victimization. The goal then is to assess the increase of bigger repression and victimization to the democratic behavior of this population. Then next section explain the source of the data to analyze this context and our empirical estimations.

3. DATA

3.1. ***SOA* Graduates.** The data from the military personal that attended *SOA* came from *School of the Americas Watch*. This organization was created in 1990 with the aim to account school graduates human right violations in the Americas. It records information about school attendees based on official reports from the United States government. The data set contains records of school attendees since its open 1946. It

includes graduate name, country of origin, military rank or position at which attended the school, attended program name and the dates of training².

Our analysis covers the cold war period of the school, that is the period from the school inauguration until 1991. During this period most of countries in the Americas sent personnel to the school. Our sample includes the countries that were independent in 1949 excluding Cuba and Haiti. Figure 1 presents the spatial distribution from all the 18 countries in our sample during the entire period of analysis. Overall all countries sent trainees but there is a lot of variance in the total number of personnel trained. Colombia, Peru and El Salvador were the client countries that used the US military training sending more than three thousand people. However, there is difference in the kind of personnel that was sent to training. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the type of personnel send by each country. While countries like Chile and Brazil send a big proportion lower rank officers other countries such as Mexico and Bolivia sent mostly enlisted personnel.

3.2. Country Data. We will exploit this temporal and spatial variation distribution of graduates to link the relation between democracy functioning and the amount of personnel sent to the school. To achieve this we use cross country data from several different sources.

3.2.1. Democracy Measure. In order to measure democracy “quality” we use the traditional democracy Polity IV index. This data allow us to construct a panel from 1946 to 1991 with the democratic trajectories of all 18 countries in our sample. This index record not only a distinction between democracy and authoritarian regimens but also it is able to distinguish different degrees of variation within each regime. Panel A in Figure 3 shows the biannual evolution of *SOA* by regions. while Panel B in Figure 3 points the years of democracy deterioration for each country in the sample. That is the year in which there was a reduction in Polity IV index. The goal of our work is to link this two indicator and show the relation of democracy and the graduates stock. This graph shows how negative movements in democracy quality was preceded from an increase in the number of trainees. In 1960’s decade and early 1970’s several deterioration of democracy trajectories in countries in the southern cone took placed after the increase in the number of *SOA* graduates. In the same way the reduction in the democracy in Central American countries in 1970 and 1980 match a rise in the number of personnel graduated from these countries.

²The record is not perfect, however we are able to identify in all the cases the year in which the trainee graduated and leave the school

3.2.2. *Democracy Perception.* Finally, we complement the cross-country data with democracy perceptions after the end of cold war. In particular we look the results of the Latinobarometer from 1995-2017. This set of surveys were performed in the 18 countries of our sample in different period of time and allow us to measure how respondents valuable usefulness of a democratic regimen in comparison with an authoritarian regime. Moreover we are able to assess democratic behavior such as willingness to vote and perceptions regarding several institutions like army.

3.3. **Within Country Data: Colombia.** The richness of *SOA* graduates date allow us to identify all *SOA* graduates. We link this information with military commanders in Colombia and explore the relation between training at the *SOA* and military results within the areas commanded by different operational units. Figure 4 shows time evolution of Colombia *SOA* graduates during the cold war. This country started to use US training services mostly after 1975 sending generally academy students to the training. We exploit the fact that these attendees must reach higher army ranks after 25 years and we look their performance when they are in charge a brigade³.

3.3.1. *Brigades Commanders and Army Structure.* First, we construct a dataset with brigade commanders in Colombia from 1990-1991. The visibility of brigade commanders allow us to identify the whole universe of commanders. We were not able to obtain officials records of army commanders however but we use the data gathered by Acemoglu et al. (2018). This data identifies the brigade commanders using *El Tiempo* online archive, Colombia's main national newspaper. we reconstruct a biannually⁴ panel with military commanders and link with *SOA* records. The historical army structure, that is the jurisdiction of divisions, brigades and battalions, is recover from army's website expired version and newspapers archives that mentioned the creation of new military units.

Figure 5 shows the evolution of brigades in Colombia and the share of brigades that were under the direction of a *SOA* graduate. After 2000 there was an increase in the number of brigades in the country (which means that brigades started to cover lower area sizes) but the share of brigades commanded by an school attendee remains the same during this period around (40%). Also, the commanders share trained while being students increase during the decade of 2000's matching the 25 period after the increase in the number of personnel send by Colombia. In total we identify 209 brigade

³A brigade commander has under his responsibility several battalions and he is in charge of military operations in several municipalities.

⁴Rank promotions and brigades appointments are typically done during December and June. This allow us to identify by semester the commander of each brigade

commanders from which 78 (37.3%) attended the school prior 1991. Table 1 shows the difference between commanders trained by *SOA* controlling for the year of the appointment. There are not difference in military trajectories after brigade appointments and both *SOA* graduates and other commanders remained the same average time in this position. However, *SOA* trainees were appointed by the first time to historically more violent areas, measure as the number of guerrilla and government attacks between 1985 and 1990. Last three columns of table 1 show that there are not differences in the appointments of *SOA* graduates depending if they attend the school while they were students or not. This allow me to concentrated in the effects of the *SOA* intervention regardless of the moment they were trained.

We are also able to test if the effect are coming from the fact of attending the training or thorough the diffusion of networks among armed forces in the region. To measure the influence coming other countries graduates we construct an index that account for the democratic ideas among other peer at the same time of training of Colombian graduates. we average the “inverse” Polity IV index depending on the country precedence of *SOA* graduates by semester as a rough measure of antidemocratic behavior that each Colombian trainees faced in their cohort. Figure 6 shows the evolution of antidemocratic influence of *SOA* faced by Colombians and the distribution of brigade commanders promotions. A big amount of brigade commanders were trained when the “influence” index achieved its greater value in 1975 but this started to decrease as product of the gradually democratization in the region.

3.3.2. *Armed Conflict Outcomes.* Regarding the main outcomes of interest we will look at the military operation performance we will use violence data set created by (Restrepo et al., 2004) and updated by *Universidad del Rosario*. This data record conflict related events from *NGO Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP)* of the Company of Jesus in Colombia. It reports and includes information the identity of the perpetrator and the number of victims of the incident. We will match the information of military operation from 1992 to 2010 and in particular civilians casualties during this operations at the municipality level with the brigade commander in the zone. We will evaluated the effects of *SOA* training in the conflict and victimization of civil population.

3.3.3. *Other Data.* Finally to evaluate the electoral behavior effect in zones commanded by *SOA* graduates we use electoral results from *Registraduria Nacional* from 1985 to 2010. It includes information from mayor, regional, legislative and presidential elections. It records information of votes by party and candidate. Also we complement

the data with municipality characteristics constructed by *Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE)* at Universidad de los Andes. This allow me to construct time-varying brigade geographic characters measure as the average characteristic of municipalities in the brigade jurisdiction.

4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

4.1. Cross-Country Analysis. For the cross-country analysis we exploit the times and geographical variation of personnel send by the different countries in our sample suing a dynamic panel estimation. This following equation describe the dynamic of democracy trajectories.

$$(4.1) \quad DI_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \beta_1 \times \text{Stock } SOA_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j \times DI_{ct-j} + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

Where, DI_{ct} is Polity IV democracy index in the country c at year t and $\text{Stock } SOA_{ct-5}$ is the SOA graduates stock for the five years before. α_c is a set of country fix effects that take into account time invariant country characteristics and δ_t is a set of year fixed effects. This specification include J lags of democracy index to control for the dynamic in democracy. The standard assumption of this implies that the stock of SOA graduates and past democracy is orthogonal to contemporaneous or future shocks to democracy. It means that including sufficient amount of lags in the model 4.1 we are able to eliminate serial correlation in residuals and the influence of democracy trajectories in the decisions to sent personnel to be trained in the school.

This assumption means that countries that decided to sent personnel for training are in a similar democracy trajectory in the past years. We justify this assumption by the fact that sending personnel to SOA is a political decisions and the democracy index are a summarize of several factor that can influence this decision.

4.1.1. Mechanism. In order to explore more what is beyond the relation between military training and democracy we can use country variation across different characteristics. A well functioning of democratic institution is associated with several characteristics such as social manifestation and expression of civil society. Thus, we test several mechanisms in different categories: social movement, media, political institutions and communist contention. To test the relevance of these factors we use the the following model

$$(4.2) \quad M_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \beta_1 \times \text{Stock } SOA_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j \times DI_{ct-j} + \sum_{j=1}^J \phi_j \times M_{ct-j} + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

where M_{ct} is the potential mechanism. This model, similar to our main specification, control for the democracy trajectory. This not only deal with the influence of democracy on *SOA* training decision but also the influence of democracy on this factors.

4.1.2. *Long Term Effects.* For the long term effects of the country of the aggregate of *SOA* graduates during the cold war we estimated the following model

$$(4.3) \quad Y_{ct} = \delta_t + \eta_{R(c)} + \beta_1 \times \text{Total SAO}_c + \Gamma' X_c + \varepsilon_{ct}$$

where Y_{ct} is the current democracy perception in the country c at time t and Total SAO_c is the total number graduates sent by the country. Vector X_c includes several country controls and $\eta_{R(c)}$ are regional fixed effects. Finally, since the measure came from different waves of the survey at different periods we include year fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the country-level.

The main identification challenge in equation 4.3 comes from the fact that the decision of use US military training is not endogenous for each country and it is a decision based on each country interest and goals. To overcome this we exploit an endogenous variation in the willingness to sent troops at the first stage of the school. Gill (2004) recovers some racial factor that took role in the decision of sending trainees for some countries. First, the school was created in the context of social segregated associated like the United States. They have their theories about unsuitability of white to tropical climates. Moreover, several countries believed to have strong connection with Europeans powers and were reluctant to send personnel that would be mixed with what they consider not their equals. we exploit this historical motivation we use the distance of each capital city to the Panama Canal Zone to measure the initial ties of the countries Panama and their willingness to send troop to the “tropic”. Graph 7 shows the negative relation between these to variables. Countries that are further from the zone sent a lower number of personnel to Panama.

To use this variable as an instrument this should no be only related with the total number of *SOA* graduates and with democracy perceptions just trough this variable. This is a strong but not impossible assumption. To test the robustness of this assumption we control for different variables that might be associated with democratic values in different countries such as racial composition latitude, initial level of wealth and democracy trajectories during the cold war.

Using these specifications we estimated the impact of military training during the cold war on democracy (equation 4.1), the potential mechanism effect that explain

this relation (equation 4.2), and the long term effects of this democracy changes in democratic behavior and perceptions (equation 4.3). The next empirical exercise is going to be based on within country variation after the end of the cold war.

4.2. Within Country Analysis. For the within country analysis, we exploit the of brigade commanders in Colombia after the cold war. The main goal is to identify the differences in military outcomes in municipalities commander by a *SOA* graduate. To do this we estimate the following model

$$(4.4) \quad Y_{mibt} = \gamma_m + \alpha_b + \delta_t + \beta_1 \times \text{SAO}_{bt} + \Gamma X_{bt} + \Phi Z_{it} + \Psi W_{mt} + \epsilon_{mibt}$$

where Y_{mibt} is the military outcome in municipality m , commanded by agent i and under the jurisdiction of brigade b at time t . γ_m is a set of fixed effects that control for municipality invariant characteristics and α_b does the same for brigade characteristics. It is important to note that brigade jurisdiction change of the time for different characteristics so we are able to identify differential on those municipalities that change their brigade jurisdictions. We control also for a set of commander experience variables Z_{it} that include an indicator for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and the total number of brigades that commanded. We include a set of brigade characteristics at each period of time X_{bt} that include several variable of geographic characteristics.

The main coefficient of interest is β_1 captures the effect of being a *SOA* graduate over the outcome Y . However, we am able to disentangle if the effect comes from having attend the school or if there are differentials depending on the quality of the peers that each military had in his training period. In order to estimate this effect we estimate the following model

$$(4.5) \quad Y_{mibt} = \gamma_m + \alpha_b + \delta_t + \beta_2 \times \text{Index}_{bt} + \Gamma X_{bt} + \Phi Z_{it} + \Psi W_{mt} + \epsilon_{mibt}$$

where the dummy indicator is replace by the measure of peer influence index explained above. Then β_2 captures the effect of having more non-democratic peers when attending the school. The main assumption to interpret these two coefficient as causal effect is that the assignation of commanders to brigades is random. Table 1 already shows that this is not the case in Colombia and violent units tent to be commanded by *SOA* graduates. To overcome this problem we exploit the exogenous variation from rank promotions structure in the army. Brigade generals are meant to be in charge of brigades and in order to achieve this rank officers must spend a minimum amount of time in each lower rank. If we assumed that officers are promoted after they leave *SOA* we can construct an hypothetical stock of the brigade generals available at each

semester from that are graduated from the school. Since these training took at least 10 years before the first appointment it is possible to assume that this variable is not related with military performance at the present. In an analogous way we can calculate the average influence index among those available generals as an exogenous variation to the influence index of the commander assigned to each municipality.

Figure 8 shows the evolution of these two measures after 1991. It shows a sharp increase in the hypothetical increase in the number of available brigade generals after 2003. This increase is explained by the sharp increase in academy trainees sent by Colombia after 1975. This period also coincides with an increase in the anti-democratic influence facing these graduates explained by the deterioration of democracy in the region around the same period of time.

This variable gives time variant exogenous shock to the probability of being commanded by a SOA graduate, however to recover geographical variation we weighted this measure by inverse of distance to Bogotá. The logic behind this operation is that distance to main central power in the country is associated with presence of state and therefore of the willingness to assign “better” military commanders.

Using these specifications we estimate the impact of SOA graduates on Colombia war outcomes and in particular on civilian victimization. We will also be able to link this victimization of democratic behavior after this period. The next section presents the results of the estimations presented above.

5. RESULTS

5.1. Cross country analysis. We start with the description of the results given by equation 4.1. The coefficient β_1 gives the effect of an increase in the number of SOA graduates in the five years before the measure of the democracy. Table 2 shows the effect of these graduates depending on the different type of graduates rank. Odd columns show the effect controlling by the previous measure of democracy while in even columns we control for the whole set of measures during five years before.

In all cases the coefficient of interest is negative however the effect is only significant when we take into account only lower rank officials. Enlisted personnel and soldiers never have a significant effect in democracy. According to the magnitude the effect of having sent 100 officers to training in the previous 5 years reduce around in 1/5 points the measure of democracy. Democracy is very persistent and the pattern is persistence. A robust pattern for all estimations when we control for a single lag we estimated a persistence of 0.84. At the bottom of the table we show the estimation of a middle-run impact to a constant stock of 100 graduates for 5 years. From these estimates of effect

of training to democracy and the persistence of democracy we find that this constant provision of officer trainees has a negative impact of around 3/4 points in democracy index.

These results imply that democracy is only negatively affected by officers trained at the *SOA*. Officers are those in charge and are able to take military decisions. Thus, these results suggest that democracy levels is affected by those in general positions of commanders. Student officers that were at their early stages and with no position of commander when they return to their countries are not able to change democracy paths. However, after 5 years they have a small negative effect in the democracy. This again coincided with the fact that after this period of time they start to be promoted with greater power to take decisions.

5.1.1. *Robustness.* Table 3 replicated the main estimation using a dichotomous measure of democracy. We estimate the effects using the measure created by Acemoglu et al. (2019). This is a strict measure that code democracy only when several sources record the country as a democracy. In this case general results even negative are not significant. Only having a constant and permanent stock of officer trainees after five years reduce the probability of a country being a democracy in around 3.4 percentage. This results implies that shock produced by lower rank officers is not big enough to change a democratic country to a dictatorship, however they are considerable enough to reduce the quality of the democracy.

Table 4 rule out the possibility that the results is driven by country size. That is bigger countries sent more military to *SOA* training and they are less democratic. In this table we control by differential trends depending on country size measures previous 1950. These controls are 1946 GDP, 1950 population or military size⁵. The point estimate does not vary when we introduce each control. This suggest that the effect is not spurious and it is not driven by effect bigger countries.

5.1.2. *Potential mechanism.* We explore what are the dimension in democracy that explains the negative relation between lower rank officers trained by *SOA* and democracy performance. To investigate this effect on different types of democratic expressions table 5 shows the results from equation 4.2. Our measures of mechanism come from Banks and Kenneth (2003) and include different categories of democracy expressions. Table 5 columns 1, 2 and 3 shows the effect graduates on social movements. In general

⁵The equation presented in this table is: $DI_{ct} = \alpha_c + \delta_t + \beta_1 \times \text{Stock SAO}_{ct} + \sum_{j=1}^J \gamma_j \times DI_{ct-j} + \sum_{k=1950}^K \zeta_k \times X_{c0} + \varepsilon_{ct}$, where X_{c0} is the country pre-*SOA* measure and $\sum_{k=1950}^K \zeta_k \times X_{c0}$ is the five-years differential trend.

having a bigger stock of graduates reduces strikes, violets riots and anti-government demonstrations. That means that military training is associated with a reduction on civil society expressions within the country. After 5 years of a constant stock this is translated to a reduction in around 10 percent in the manifestations. Column 4 shows the effect on the probability that the country experience a ban of political parties. 100 SOA graduates represent an increase in 1.1 perceptual in the probability of a parties ban. Moreover in column 5 we show that the training translated also in a reduction in the newspaper circulation per capita. An trainees increase translated after 5 years in a reduction of 37 newspapers per capita.

We do not argue that those are the main mechanism that graduates affected but all this evidence together help me to conclude that *SOA* graduates facilitated repression. Although this repression is not strong enough to represent a complete elimination of democracy it implies a reduction in democracy health. Finally column 6 shows that there were not changes in the communist operations inside the countries measured as the number of guerrilla warfare. We argue then that *SOA* did not have impacts on the communist fight while it is associated with democracy quality.

5.1.3. *Long term effects.* We evaluate the effects of this lower democracy levels and increase repression on democracy perception inside the country after the end of the cold war. In table 6 column one we analyse the relation of total *SOA* graduates before 1991 with response to democracy from 1995 to 2017 described in equation 4.3. Panel A show the effect on graduates on the persecution of authoritarian regime. An increase in one thousand graduates is associated with a decrease in 1 perceptual point of acceptance of authoritarian in contrast to democracy, That is, repression during the cold war translated in a support to democracy after it. Panel B and C shows the relations of the trainees and perceptions to parties. More graduates in the country are associated with more abstention to election but a reduction in the undecided levels about party support.

This three effects are in magnitude significant and for the three 1000 graduates is associated with movements of at least 10 percent in the outcome. This is not the case for the effect on perception towards armed forces. Even more gradates are linked with an increase in the armed forces negative perception, it is not a considerable increase of 5 percent in relation with average.

It is important to note that the estimated that we show in this table are associated with the change in total graduates associated with an increase in the distance to Panama canal zone. To show the robustness of our results we include additional

controls of variables that are related with the distance to the equator. It might be the case that the distance is capturing institutional performance of each country. [Acemoglu et al. \(2001\)](#) showed the persistence of institutional arrangement associated with the colonization possibilities. We control for settlers mortality and expropriation risk in columns 2 and 5 to exclude the possibility that our instrument is capturing this variation. The estimates are unchanged with the introduction of these new controls and the instrument remains strong as measured by the excluded instruments F statistics. We also rule out the possibility that our results are coming for changes in the democratic culture in the country during the cold war. We include the the average circulation of newspapers in column 4 and the total anti-government demonstrations in column 3. Again the baseline estimations are robust to the inclusion of this set of controls.

Then, we conclude that the increase in trainees at the *SOA* increase the positive assessment of citizenship towards democracy. This is consistent with the results found by [Bautista et al. \(2019\)](#). Greater levels of victimization and repression are associated with an increase in the support to democracy. Even though there is a lower level of representation of party system the general perception that democracy is better than a authoritarian regime. Although the training at *SOA* was not intended to increase democracy support due to increase in repression it indirectly produced an increase in the democracy values.

5.2. Within country effects. In this section we explore the effects of the *SOA* inside Colombia, the country that send the most number of personal to training to the US training. [Table 7](#) shows the estimate of [equation 4.4](#) in panel A and [equation 4.5](#) in panel B. It shows the effect of having a commander trained at *SOA* and the influence of antidemocratic perceptions in the region. In specific this panel shows how *SOA* training affected the military operation. It shows a deviation of military activity of the government. There is a decrease in the clashes with illegal groups (i.e. guerilla and paramilitaries). However this municipalities experienced an increase in the number of clashes between guerilla and paramilitaries that is associated with an increase of paramilitary casualties. This behaviour is consistent with the argument of a deviation of legal military actives toward illegal paramilitary groups. This effects are both present using the both measure of *SOA* effects. Greater antidemocratic influence at *SOA* increase the paramilitary activities in the municipalities commanded by those commanders sent to the school.

[Figure 9](#) explores the origin of the influence. It shows the influence coming from different kind of trainees. We explore the variance in this measure and [table 10](#) shows

the effect coming from this influence. It shows that the effect is coming from the anti-democratic influence coming from active personnel, that is from the enlisted and lower rank officers. This in contrast to the influence of officer students that does not impact the military operations.

To explore victimization patterns affected by *SOA* graduates in table 8 we show the effects of civilians casualties. It shows that the reduction in government activities decreases the level of victimization during government attacks. Nonetheless the increase of paramilitary effect is associated with an even greater increase in the victimization of civilians due to paramilitary activities. This means that in the context of a continue internal conflict the *SOA* training is associated with greater levels of victimization mains due to change of government activities towards paramilitary activities.

We showed that *SOA* graduates increase victimization levels in Colombia even after the end of the cold war. In the particular and unique context of the internal conflict the *SOA* as during cold war is associated with greater repression levels towards civil society. The goal is then to look if this increase in repression is associated with different democratic behaviours and social manifestation after the reduction in the conflict levels. For this in a future we will analysis the electoral results of the country after 1991.

6. CONCLUSION

Foreign interventions are important to understand local policy and development. In this paper we show how *SOA* graduates decrease democracy quality. In particular officials that are in charge and hold military power are associated with reduction of democracy index and greater repressions levels. In the context of Colombia we show a bigger victimization of civilians in areas commanded by *SOA* brigades commanders. Illegal paramilitary attacks increased the mortality in those areas under the blessing of commanders trained by the United States.

In our cross country estimation we exploit the variation in the number of trainees sent to the school. We use a dynamic panel strategies to isolate the effect of democracy on the number of graduates and we estimated the effect of them in the democracy levels. Even more we exploit the initial willingness of countries to send personnel to the tropics as a exogenous source to assess the effects of total training into democracy support. Overall, we showed that increased levels of democracy support is a unintended consequence of repression strategies performed by military forces during the cold war and therefore and unintended consequence of US military interventions.


In the case of Colombia we exploit promotion rules exogenous to estimated the effects of *SOA* brigades commanders on military operations. we show that these military units

deviated operation to illegal paramilitary support that increases the number of civilians kills. We show then that US involvement even in subtle and indirect strategy had effects in local actions even after the end of the proposed intervention.

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
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FIGURE 1. SAO Graduates by Country




Notes: This map presents the spatial distribution by origin country of SOA graduates from 1946 to 1991.

FIGURE 2. Distribution Share Rank Gradautes




Notes: This figure presents the total share of SOA graduates by rank for each country. Panel A presents the share of enlisted personnel, panel B presents the share of officer students and panel C shows the share of low officer graduates.

FIGURE 3. SOA Gradautes and Regime




A. SOA Gradautes by Region of Origin



B. Democracy Deterioration


Notes: In panel A we present the temporal distribution of SOA graduates from 1946 to 1991. We show two-year moving averages to smooth the data. In panel B we present the timeline of democracy deterioration. *Andean countries* are Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru. *Central America countries* are Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. *Southern Cone countries* are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. *Other countries* are Mexico, Costa Rica, Panama and Dominican Republic.

FIGURE 4. Colombia SOA Graduates by Rank




Notes: We present the temporal distribution of Colombia SOA graduates 1946 to 1991. We show two-year moving averages to smooth the data.

FIGURE 5. Evolution Colombian Brigades Commanders




Notes: This graph presents the evolution of number of brigades in Colombia from 1991:1 to 2010:2 and the share of brigades according training of commander.

FIGURE 6. Evolution SOA Influence on Colombian Brigades




Notes: This graph presents the evolution of peer influence on brigades from 1946 to 1991. Also it presents the semester of graduation for Colombian brigades commanders between 1991:1 to 2010:2.

FIGURE 7. First State: Distance to Canal Zone and SOA Graduates



Notes: This graph shows the relation between the total number of graduates between 1946 and 1991 and the distance to capital cities.

FIGURE 8. Evolution Predicted Stock and Influence



Notes: We presents the evolution of predicted stock of SOA graduates able to command a brigade. We also show the predicted influence of the stock between 1991:1 to 2010:2 .

TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics: Brigade Commanders by Training

	Trained by SOA			Trained by SOA while student		
	No (131)	Yes (78)	Diff	No (28)	Yes (50)	Diff
<i>Military</i>						
Number semester in charge	3.6 (2.2)	3.5 (2.1)	0.164 (0.295)	4.0 (2.0)	3.2 (2.1)	0.186 (1.042)
Number of brigades commanded	1.4 (0.8)	1.3 (0.6)	-0.042 (0.094)	1.5 (0.7)	1.2 (0.5)	0.028 (0.225)
<i>First Brigade Characteristics</i>						
<i>Historic Violence</i>						
Clashes 1985-1990	37.4 (33.6)	46.3 (44.2)	10.464* (6.072)	67.6 (54.4)	34.3 (32.1)	-29.683 (24.643)
Guerrilla Attacks 1985-1990	45.1 (51.0)	62.6 (73.3)	19.003* (9.646)	91.0 (91.2)	46.7 (56.1)	-25.497 (45.136)
Paramilitary Attacks 1985-1990	3.7 (4.3)	4.3 (5.7)	0.797 (0.800)	6.6 (6.8)	3.1 (4.7)	-2.400 (3.254)
Government Attacks 1985-1990	5.3 (6.1)	6.9 (7.9)	1.886* (1.116)	10.6 (9.5)	4.9 (6.1)	-4.952 (4.259)
Kills civilinas 1985-1990	100.4 (93.2)	121.2 (131.2)	25.313 (17.604)	180.6 (157.4)	87.9 (101.3)	-33.828 (72.127)
<i>Geographic</i>						
Distance to capital city	310.3 (217.9)	350.3 (242.4)	26.302 (40.464)	327.6 (271.2)	363.1 (226.6)	-111.778 (98.204)
Altitude	798.4 (678.2)	725.0 (594.9)	-111.624 (108.853)	847.5 (562.4)	656.3 (607.0)	-272.510 (251.287)
Soil erosion	1.6 (0.6)	1.5 (0.6)	-0.088 (0.094)	1.6 (0.5)	1.5 (0.6)	-0.091 (0.225)
Water availability	3.4 (0.4)	3.4 (0.4)	0.111* (0.060)	3.5 (0.3)	3.4 (0.4)	-0.058 (0.167)
Soil quality	2.5 (0.6)	2.5 (0.5)	0.039 (0.094)	2.5 (0.4)	2.5 (0.6)	0.043 (0.217)
Rainfall	1941.9 (612.7)	2084.2 (729.2)	173.225 (108.684)	2104.4 (722.0)	2072.9 (740.3)	-295.962 (371.920)
ln Population	13.8 (1.1)	14.0 (1.2)	0.202 (0.189)	14.6 (1.0)	13.7 (1.1)	-0.721 (0.441)
Number of municipalities	53.9 (40.1)	58.2 (43.5)	3.665 (6.572)	79.9 (44.1)	46.0 (38.5)	-8.814 (20.218)
Area km^2	58586.9 (65306.1)	60084.1 (64119.6)	5619.681 (9755.047)	82515.6 (78816.2)	47522.5 (50883.8)	4.6e + 04 (3.7e+04)

Notes: Difference controlling by first brigade appointment halfyear fixed effects.

TABLE 2. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{$t-5$} /100	-0.036 (0.025)	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.008 (0.035)	-0.056* (0.031)	-0.045 (0.027)	-0.212*** (0.059)	-0.184** (0.065)
<i>Democracy</i>								
Democracy Index _{$t-1$}	0.844*** (0.024)	0.908*** (0.040)	0.843*** (0.024)	0.910*** (0.040)	0.844*** (0.024)	0.909*** (0.040)	0.841*** (0.023)	0.905*** (0.039)
Democracy Index _{$t-2$}	-	-0.049 (0.037)	-	-0.049 (0.037)	-	-0.048 (0.037)	-	-0.050 (0.037)
Democracy Index _{$t-3$}	-	-0.033 (0.058)	-	-0.034 (0.058)	-	-0.033 (0.058)	-	-0.033 (0.058)
Democracy Index _{$t-4$}	-	0.039 (0.048)	-	0.039 (0.048)	-	0.039 (0.048)	-	0.040 (0.048)
Democracy Index _{$t-5$}	-	-0.047** (0.021)	-	-0.049** (0.021)	-	-0.048** (0.021)	-	-0.043* (0.023)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	-0.131 (0.092)	-0.116 (0.090)	-0.023 (0.129)	-0.031 (0.134)	-0.204* (0.118)	-0.173* (0.105)	-0.774*** (0.216)	-0.704*** (0.242)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy Polity IV index. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees _{$t-5$} is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 3. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy (Dichotomous)

	Total		Troop		Academy Officers		Lower Rank Officers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy ($\mu = 0.4, \sigma = 0.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5} /100	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.005)
<i>Democracy (Dichotomous)</i>								
Democracy _{t-1}	0.833*** (0.023)	0.826*** (0.042)	0.831*** (0.023)	0.825*** (0.042)	0.833*** (0.023)	0.826*** (0.042)	0.834*** (0.023)	0.824*** (0.042)
Democracy _{t-2}	-	0.021 (0.035)	-	0.021 (0.035)	-	0.021 (0.035)	-	0.022 (0.035)
Democracy _{t-3}	-	0.015 (0.062)	-	0.014 (0.062)	-	0.015 (0.062)	-	0.015 (0.062)
Democracy _{t-4}	-	0.007 (0.033)	-	0.007 (0.033)	-	0.007 (0.033)	-	0.008 (0.033)
Democracy _{t-5}	-	-0.060*** (0.020)	-	-0.060*** (0.020)	-	-0.060*** (0.020)	-	-0.056** (0.020)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.008)	0.009 (0.011)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.040** (0.020)	-0.034* (0.020)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	730	716	730	716	730	716	730	716
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy dichotomous indicator. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees_{t-5} is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 4. Dynamic Panel: Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy with Additional Controls

	No Control		GDP 1946		Pop 1950		Military Size 1950	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Dependent Variable: Democracy Index ($\mu = 0.2, \sigma = 6.5$)</i>								
Stock SOA Trainees _{t-5} /100	-0.212*** (0.059)	-0.184** (0.065)	-0.161** (0.071)	-0.141* (0.078)	-0.226*** (0.062)	-0.204*** (0.068)	-0.222*** (0.065)	-0.203** (0.071)
<i>Democracy</i>								
Democracy Index _{t-1}	0.841*** (0.023)	0.905*** (0.039)	0.834*** (0.021)	0.894*** (0.041)	0.833*** (0.024)	0.890*** (0.038)	0.830*** (0.025)	0.886*** (0.039)
Democracy Index _{t-2}	-	-0.050 (0.037)	-	-0.046 (0.040)	-	-0.048 (0.037)	-	-0.047 (0.038)
Democracy Index _{t-3}	-	-0.033 (0.058)	-	-0.034 (0.057)	-	-0.033 (0.059)	-	-0.034 (0.059)
Democracy Index _{t-4}	-	0.040 (0.048)	-	0.041 (0.052)	-	0.042 (0.050)	-	0.044 (0.052)
Democracy Index _{t-5}	-	-0.043* (0.023)	-	-0.044 (0.026)	-	-0.036 (0.026)	-	-0.035 (0.027)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	-0.774*** (0.216)	-0.704*** (0.242)	-0.578** (0.261)	-0.531* (0.296)	-0.810*** (0.222)	-0.761*** (0.246)	-0.793*** (0.228)	-0.748*** (0.253)
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	738	738	738	738	738	738	738	738
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainees on democracy Polity IV index. Sample from 1951 - 1991. Stock SOA Trainees_{t-5} is the stock of SOA graduates for the previous five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the country level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 5. Mechanism: Effect of SOA Graduates on Social Manifestations

	Strikes (1)	Violent Riots (2)	Anti-governemnt Demonstrations (3)	Parties Banned (4)	Newspaper Circulation (5)	Guerilla Warfare (6)
Stock Lower Rank Trainees _{t-5} /100	-0.032** (0.013)	-0.046** (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.023)	0.011*** (0.003)	-5.891*** (1.589)	-0.011 (0.014)
Constant Stock Effect 5 Years After/100	-0.038** (0.018)	-0.056** (0.026)	-0.092*** (0.023)	0.035*** (0.011)	-37.249*** (11.222)	-0.015 (0.021)
Mean Dep. Var.	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.1	803.3	0.4
N Country	18	18	18	18	18	18
N	756	756	756	756	756	756
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of SOA trainings on intermadate variables. Sample from 1951 - 1991. *SOA Trainees* is the per capita number of SOA graduates of the country. *Democracy Index_{t-1}* is the per capita stock of SOA graduates in total for the privious five years. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 6. Long Term Effect of SOA Graduates on Democracy Perception

	No Additional Controls (1)	Settlers Mortality (2)	Anti-government Demonstrations (3)	Newspaper Circulation (4)	Expropriation Risk (5)
<i>Panel A: Authoritarian regime is better or as good as democracy ($\mu = 0.19$)</i>					
All SOA Trainees/100	-0.001** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	46.40	46.73	43.97	57.07	26.11
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	325	306	325	325	306
<i>Panel B: Which party would you vote? - Abstention ($\mu = 0.26$)</i>					
All SOA Trainees/100	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	45.21	46.71	43.10	55.75	25.58
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	307	289	307	307	289
<i>Panel C: Which party would you vote? - Undecided ($\mu = 0.24$)</i>					
All SOA Trainees/100	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	47.02	47.23	44.61	57.48	26.51
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	324	305	324	324	305
<i>Panel D: Negative Perception Armed Forces ($\mu = 0.54$)</i>					
All SOA Trainees/100	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Exc. Instruments F-stat	48.10	46.97	45.48	59.85	34.22
N Country	18	17	18	18	17
N	298	279	298	298	279
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table presents estimates of the effect of all SOA trainees on vote abstention. Sample from 1995 - 2017 with gaps. *SOA Trainees* is total number of SOA graduates of the country from 1946 to 1991. Basic controls include share of democracy and the total economic aid received from US during the cold war; latitude, GDP in 1946 and regional dummies. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

7. ANALYSIS

TABLE 7. SOA Training and Militar Performance

	Clashes			Attacks			Casualties		
	Gov.-Gue. (1)	Gov.-Par. (2)	Gue.-Par. (3)	Gue. (4)	Par. (5)	Gov. (6)	Gue. (7)	Par. (8)	Gov. (9)
<i>Panel A: SOA Attendance Effect</i>									
SOA Training	-2.057* (1.053)	-0.183*** (0.038)	0.502*** (0.101)	-0.150 (0.869)	-0.838*** (0.276)	-0.687** (0.274)	-5.638 (3.894)	2.382** (1.113)	-2.181 (2.212)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54
<i>Panel B: SOA influence Effect</i>									
Influence Index	-0.812** (0.316)	-0.055*** (0.011)	0.103*** (0.031)	-0.103 (0.173)	-0.202*** (0.068)	-0.203** (0.088)	-1.386 (0.863)	0.514 (0.345)	-0.488 (0.316)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 8. SOA Training and Civilian Casualties

	Total	Civilian Killings during...			
	Killings (1)	Clash (2)	Gue. Att. (3)	Par. Att. (4)	Gov. Att. (5)
<i>Panel A: SOA Attendance Effect</i>					
SOA Training	0.509 (1.199)	0.772 (0.608)	-0.028 (0.715)	2.048*** (0.698)	-0.972*** (0.345)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54	245.54
<i>Panel B: SOA influence Effect</i>					
Influence Index	-0.097 (0.344)	0.239 (0.181)	0.075 (0.211)	0.133 (0.226)	-0.200*** (0.059)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23	452.23
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓


Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

TABLE 9. First Stage Results

	SOA Training (1)	Influence Index (2)
SOA Stock	0.000*** (0.000)	– –
Influence SOA Stock	– –	0.180*** (0.008)
N Mun.	1091	1091
N	40786	40786
Period FE	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.

FIGURE 9. Influence to Colombian Peronel in SOA



Notes: This map presents the spatial distribution by country of procedece of SOA graduates 1946 to 1991.

TABLE 10. SOA Training and Military Performance

	Clashes			Attacks			Causalities		
	Gov.-Gue. (1)	Gov.-Par. (2)	Gue.-Par. (3)	Gue. (4)	Par. (5)	Gov. (6)	Gue. (7)	Par. (8)	Gov. (9)
<i>Panel A: SOA influence Effect – Academy Trainees</i>									
Influence Index	-22.767 (42.909)	-1.637 (3.050)	3.563 (6.690)	0.755 (5.734)	-3.279 (6.404)	-5.590 (10.644)	-38.017 (75.594)	17.820 (34.976)	-12.362 (25.153)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29	0.29
<i>Panel B: SOA influence Effect – Lower Officers Trainees</i>									
Influence Index	-0.307*** (0.108)	-0.020*** (0.004)	0.030*** (0.009)	-0.083 (0.067)	-0.105*** (0.026)	-0.083*** (0.030)	-0.581** (0.296)	0.154 (0.108)	-0.230* (0.127)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10	2969.10
<i>Panel C: SOA influence Effect – Enlisted Trainees</i>									
Influence Index	-0.260*** (0.081)	-0.017*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.006)	-0.087 (0.061)	-0.076*** (0.021)	-0.073*** (0.023)	-0.558** (0.257)	0.108 (0.076)	-0.239* (0.140)
N Mun.	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091	1091
N	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786	40786
Exc. Instruments F-stat.	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14	4471.14
Period FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Mun FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Sample from 1992:1 - 2010:2. *SOA Training* is a dummy for municipalities under a brigade commanded by a SOA graduate. *Influence Index* is the index for influence of commander while attended SOA. Commander controls include the level of experience of the military, a dummy for a new commander in the brigade, total number of semesters being a commander and total number of brigades commanded. Brigade controls include average elevation, water availability, soil erosion, soil quality and rainfall, log total population, log rural population and brigade area. Municipality controls include log total population and log rural population. Errors in parentheses are robust against heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level.